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Abstract: The feast introduces an interruption in the flow of everyday life. Within the 
limits marked by such an interruption, a form of experience different from the ordi-
nary takes place. The time of feast evokes and makes present the sacred time in which 
events that founded human society took place. In festivals, on one hand, one can grasp 
and represent the meaning that grounds human experience; on the other hand, a form 
of full life takes place. In the modern era, festivals lose their connection with the reli-
gious dimension, and such features fade away. Yet they do not disappear entirely. They 
are grasped in a fragmentary way, and this is enough to turn them into marks of re-
sistance against the reduction of human experience to a purely utilitarian dimension. 
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Resumen: La fiesta introduce una interrupción en el flujo de la vida cotidiana. Dentro 
de los límites marcados por tal interrupción, tiene lugar una forma de experiencia 
diferente de la ordinaria. El momento de la fiesta evoca y hace presente el tiempo sa-
grado en el que tuvieron lugar los acontecimientos que fundaron la sociedad humana. 
En los festivales, por un lado, uno puede captar y representar el significado que funda-
menta la experiencia humana; Por otro lado, se produce una forma de vida plena. En 
la era moderna, los festivales pierden su conexión con la dimensión religiosa, y tales 
características se desvanecen. Sin embargo, no desaparecen por completo. Se captan 
de manera fragmentaria, y esto es suficiente para convertirlos en signos de resistencia 
contra la reducción de la experiencia humana a una dimensión puramente utilitaria.
Palabras clave: FIESTA; INTERRUPCIÓN; TIEMPO; SENTIDO; PLENITUD; RE-
DUCCIÓN
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“A life without parties would be like an endless road without an inn” 
(βίος ἀνεόρταστος μακρὴ ὁδὸς ἀπανδόκευτος). Despite its brevity, this say-
ing by Democritus (fr. 230) recalls two main features of the feast, with 
which we will begin our analysis2. On one hand, there is an interruption 
in the flow of daily life; on the other, within the limits marked by this 
suspension, a different form of experience is realized: a pause, which is 
in turn also a function of the continuation of the everyday life. The first 
aspect requires an intellectual operation, a boundary, which marks the 
temporal becoming and gives it an order, so that generally the feast is 
linked to the establishment of a calendar. The second aspect consists in 
the emergence of a different quality of life, which in the feast becomes 
actual. The intellectual operation is functional to the experimentation of a 
different experience, the time needs to be limited in order to live the feast; 
on the other hand, the feast has a value in itself, but is also connected to 
the normal time; it is a pause that gives breath, allows to better continue 
the everyday life and therefore has an influence on it. We can therefore 
speak of a qualitative interruption.
The analysis of these two aspects and their relationship can also be 
expressed by using another jargon, the one used by Jan Assmann in an 
essay in which he connects the feast to the issue of cultural memory. The 
human being, says the Egyptologist, is a two-dimensional being3.  In this 
expression there is an explicit reference to the late modernity condition 
of the “one-dimensional man” criticized by Marcuse, but the aim of the 
essay is not sociological, but properly ontological. The first dimension is 
that of Alltag, of the everyday life, characterized by contingency, scarcity 
and routine. This is contrasted by a second dimension, whose features are 
a well-established order, fullness and a tendency to transcend the every-
day life that expresses itself in reflection or in an effervescence capable of 
excesses. The two dimensions can be described as two forms of temporal-
ity: the first is that of everyday life, the second is the “other time”, which 
includes the founding events of a society. In correspondence with this we 
can distinguish two forms of memory: the communicative memory, which 
ensures the functioning of daily life, and the cultural memory, which the-
matizes the other time and therefore has as its object all that which was 
founded in a distant past and establishes the unity and identity of a cul-
ture and a society.
[2] On this fragment s. N. Spineto, Dalla festa in Grecia alla festa come categoria antropologica, in S. Petrosi-
no (ed.), La festa. Raccogliersi, riconoscersi, smarrirsi, Jaca Book, Milano 2013, pp. 35-49.
[3] J. Assmann, Der zweidimensionale Mensch: das Fest als Medium des kollektiven Gedächtnisses, in J. Ass-
mann, Th. Sundermeier (eds.), Das Fest und das Heilige. Kontrapunkte des Alltags, Studien zum Verstehen 
fremder Religionen 1, Gütersloh 1991, pp. 13-30.
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For Assmann the human being is constitutively two-dimensional: the 
first dimension is not enough, because the world itself - or, we might say, 
the experience - is two-dimensional and equivocal (zweidimensional and 
zweideutig), and thus requires to be interpreted. The human being neces-
sarily questions the meaning of its experience: this effort has a fundamen-
tally collective character, and lies at the origin of culture. The meaning 
that from time to time human groups have developed should find expres-
sion, should be manifested: and the feast, with its rituals, is precisely the 
privileged place in which this sense is represented and this fullness, which 
illuminates the coexistence and the daily life, is made present in such a 
way. The feast thus assumes, according to Assmann, a central role in the 
cultural memory, and this is especially true for societies without writing: 
with the progress of society, with the use of writing and with the prolif-
eration of cultural institutions, this centrality of the celebration tends to 
decrease. According to this interpretation, therefore, the feast, especially 
in archaic societies, is connected to the need for the relationship with “an-
other time” and, more profoundly, with another and more fundamental 
dimension.
As we can see, Assmann’s theory has a highly systematic profile: it 
assigns an important role to the feast, but places it within a general frame-
work in which the decisive element is the necessity to elaborate meaning, 
conceived in turn as an entire web of beliefs and institutions that establish 
the identity and cohesion of a society and a culture; in this context the 
issue, very dear to Assmann, of cultural memory assumes a decisive im-
portance. On this basis, the Egyptologist also gives a reason that helps to 
explain the fact that in recent times, especially in the modern age, the im-
portance of the feast decreases. This last point is currently the subject of 
a wide discussion, and scholars often emphasize that since the eighteenth 
century the feast changes its character, moves away from its original reli-
gious meaning, and is rather connected to the celebration of free time. In 
Assmann’s approach the reference to religion is not explicitly addressed 
and the question is then treated in a different perspective, which rather 
looks at the relevance that the search for the second dimension has in the 
different historical phases. In general I would say that Assmann’s pro-
posal provides important elements for the analysis of the feast; however, 
precisely because of its systematic character, it perhaps emphasizes the 
need to refer to the second dimension too early, and to some extent over-
shadows the fact that, on a phenomenological level, the sphere of everyday 
experience has a primary role: we live first of all in everyday life, and the 
feast is first experienced as a hiatus introduced in everyday life.
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Thus we could say that the feast is first of all an interruption of the Allt-
ag, the ordinary time in which everyday life goes on. The time of feast is 
therefore a special time, marked by activities, mostly ritual or in any case 
regulated, that do not take place in ordinary time: it is primarily about ac-
tions aimed to honor the gods, that is to say, sacrifices, processions, hymns 
and ritual dances, competitions, especially the athletic ones, but also other 
kinds of competitions. In several cases there are also recorded festivities 
that aim to the transgression of the rules that apply in normal time, or 
even to their inversion, as in the famous case of the carnival studied by 
Bakhtin: as several scholars have noted, these types of action, tending to 
the license or even to the excess, are permitted precisely because they take 
place at that precise time, expected and regulated. As Spineto reminds, 
the pseudo-platonic Definitions contain an entry `Eort» which defines the 
feast as a “sacred time determined by laws”4.
 The time of the feast, however, is not just a special time that interrupts 
the ordinary one according to well-defined norms: in many important cas-
es, in Greece but also in various other cultures, it evokes a sacred and 
founding time, or even makes it present. This is the time of the origins, 
the time of the events that, thanks to the work of the gods, heroes or an-
cestors, founded human society. Thanks to ritual acts this time bursts into 
the present time, human beings take part for a limited and determined 
period in the life of the gods, and this contact regenerates the present time 
and the human society. This phenomenon was illustrated in a particularly 
trenchant way by Mircea Eliade in his famous study on the myth of the 
eternal return, specifically dedicated to archaic cultures5. Many aspects 
of Eliade’s theory have been questioned by subsequent research, but his 
analysis remains an important point of reference even today, and the idea 
that interests us here, namely the participation of feast time to the time of 
origins, remains confirmed. It is well known that Eliade opposed the circu-
lar conception of time, characteristic of the archaic cultures, to the linear 
one, typical of the biblical religion. In this respect, it should be recalled 
that even in a linear conception oriented in an eschatological sense, festi-
val rituals connect to the foundational time, which in this case is the final 
one: the most evident case is that of the Eucharistic banquet, which is an 
anticipation of the eschatological reality of the Kingdom of God.
[4] Definitions 415 a. The essay by N. Spineto, Dalla festa in Grecia alla festa come categoria antropologica, 
cit., shows very well how, through a careful comment of this definition, it is possible to bring out the main 
characters of the festivals of ancient Greece.
[5] M. Eliade, Le mythe de l’éternel retour, Gallimard, Paris 1949; engl. trans. by Willard R. Trask, The Myth 
of the Eternal Return: Cosmos and History, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1971.
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In summary we can say that both in the circular conception that evokes 
the time of the origins, and in the eschatological conception that antic-
ipates the final time, the time of the feast interrupts the ordinary time 
because it recalls and makes present the time of foundation. This founda-
tional time is, on one hand, a time of fullness, in which human experience 
finds its complete fulfillment; on the other hand, it illuminates the human 
experience as a whole and discovers its meaning. In this perspective, the 
centrality of the religious dimension in the experience of the feast of ar-
chaic and ancient cultures is confirmed; I think that only by starting from 
here should we understand the social and political function of the feast, 
which certainly has an important role in strengthening the cohesion and 
awareness of society. This aspect, which has been underlined since the 
fundamental studies by Durkheim and Mauss, cannot be affirmed in a 
unilateral way, separating it from the religious one.
Often the experience of the feast has been brought closer to that of the 
game. Research on the latter topic has by now produced a vast literature, 
but a very prominent place is still occupied today by the classical work by 
Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens, originally published in German in 19386. 
Huizinga claimed the fundamental role that the game plays in the forma-
tion of culture, and proposed a definition of this activity that presents it 
as a free action, located outside ordinary life, placed in a delimited space 
and time, devoid of material interest, able to take place through an order 
regulated by determinate rules and to arouse social relations. He indicat-
ed the fundamental character of the game in its representative character 
(as Darstellung, or presentation, of a sense) and in competition. He also 
pointed out the close relationship that links the game to the sacred rite 
and the feast; the sacred action is a drama in which an event of cosmic 
significance is on play, it is presented (as Darstellung); the suspension of 
ordinary life and the limitation in time and space are also elements that 
link the game to the feast. According to the Dutch scholar the close rela-
tionship that links the game at the feast does not hinder to recognize that 
the game has a priority: “Gradually the significance of a sacred act perme-
ates the playing. Ritual grafts itself upon it; but the primary thing is and 
remains play”7.
The theme of the game and its relationship with the feast also plays 
an important role in Wolfhart Pannenberg’s anthropology, particularly in 
the discussion devoted to the foundations of culture. The German theo-
logian considers Huizinga’s book of great importance: Huizinga’s thesis, 
[6] J. Huizinga, Homo ludens, engl. trans. Homo Ludens, a study of the play element in culture, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, London 1949.
[7] Ibid., p. 18.
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which sees in the game the foundation of culture, fits with Pannenberg’s 
perspective, which on one hand recognizes that the unity of culture cannot 
be founded only on myth and religion, but on the other hand rejects the 
“typically modern secularist prejudice”, according to which culture would 
be only a human creation8. At the basis of culture, as well as at the basis of 
all human experience, there is, according to Pannenberg,  an experience of 
sense that cannot be reduced to the meaning planned by the subject, but 
it is also, first and foremost, a sense that the human being encounters and 
receives. Huizinga’s thesis on the primacy of the game should therefore be 
accepted, but also corrected. The game is indeed a primary experience, and 
the ritual game of worship is grafted onto it; but this is possible because 
from the beginning the game includes a component, albeit embryonic, of 
experience and representation of meaning. In short, the game is primary, 
as Huizinga maintains, but not in its purely ludic component, as the Dutch 
scholar would have it.
Pannenberg also accepts, and I would say with some enthusiasm, the 
distinction between the two fundamental aspects of the game proposed 
by Huizinga: for him too, Darstellung and competition are the essential 
components of the game experience, and it must certainly be recognized 
that the dimension of the competition is widely present in the game, even 
when we are not dealing properly with races. Nevertheless, Pannenberg’s 
interest goes essentially to the dimension of Darstellung, that is to say the 
experience and the expression of meaning. In this context it is not useless 
to recall that Darstellung is a technical term of Hegelian thought, where 
it indicates the adequate presentation of truth, taken in its entirety. The 
special attention paid to this dimension leads Pannenberg to identify in 
the Darstellung of the cosmic sense the main character of the feast. The 
recognition of the meaning that unfolds in the feast grounds in the par-
ticipants the self-understanding of their cultural and collective identity. 
Certainly Pannenberg specifies that this fundamental meaning must, on 
one hand, be grasped, and on the other hand it must also be repeated and 
realized, as it happens in the feast; however, in his interpretation the em-
phasis is above all on this rather intellectual dimension, of the grasping 
and the understanding of the meaning.
If we now return to the contributions that we saw before, and partic-
ularly to the suggestions of Eliade and Assmann, we must recognize that 
next to the aspect of the experience of meaning, the reflections on our topic 
often highlight the experience of fullness that is realized in the feast. The 
[8] W. Pannenberg, Anthropologie in theologischer Perpektive, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1983, 
p. 311, engl. trans. by Matthew J. O’Connell, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, Bloomsbury, London 
1985, p. 322.
– 41 –
two aspects are certainly connected, but they also need to be distinguished. 
The experience in which we grasp the fundamental sense of one’s own life, 
as well as of the life of the community, certainly contributes to the feeling 
of living a fuller life, but from this point of view to be emphasized is the 
intellectual dimension, the need to comprehend the meaning that grounds 
us. The aspect of fullness, however, is primarily something to be experi-
enced: by dancing the same dance that the gods perform on the Olympus 
certainly conveys a sense of harmony and a sense of sovereign cosmic or-
der, but it is not primarily an intellectual experience: it is something that 
we live directly. It seems to me that this point, that is, the distinction and 
the connection between expression of meaning and experience of fullness, 
can provide useful suggestions to the reflection on the feast.
In contemporary society, or more generally in the modern era at least 
since the French revolution, these aspects of the feast fade away: the 
feast loses its essential link with the religious sphere that characterized 
it in ancient times, and is increasingly connected directly to the sphere of 
enjoyment of leisure time. The analysis of this phenomenon, well known 
and widely discussed, would obviously require further research; neverthe-
less it seems to me that from what has been said so far, some hints can at 
least be drawn.
Despite the many criticisms that have been raised against to the no-
tion of meaning, I do not think that the issue can be solved by dismissing 
this issue. On the contrary, the question of meaning seems to grow in the 
contemporary experience, although it certainly struggles to find answers. 
What seems to be excluded, in the contemporary experience, is the demand 
to grasp with a glance, so to speak, the overall meaning of experience.  It 
is true that the meaning somehow implies a form of unity of experience, 
but is it possible to think of a meaning, without it being governed by a 
dominant One? These questions have led to think that the meaning that is 
accessible to human beings is not encountered in the whole and does not 
develop into an overall conception of the real, but it can perhaps be caught 
in the particular, as a whole in the fragment. Developing an idea put for-
ward by Ugo Perone9, I think that the meaning could be better glimpsed 
in the relationship between different relevant nuclei of finite experience: 
in their correlation, it is possible to grasp something that is greater than 
ourselves, something that does not outline a totality of meaning that we 
possess, but that hints at a further and deeper dimension, with which we 
enter into a relationship, without being able to dispose of it.
[9] Cfr. U. Perone, La secolarizzazione: un bilancio, in “Annuario Filosofico” 28 (2012), Mursia, Milano 2013, 
p. 128.
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Something similar applies also to the experience of fullness. First of 
all, fullness is by definition something that is not given in the ordinary 
flow of our daily time; the fullness features something that exceeds, that 
goes beyond our usual life. The exceedance comes before the excesses: if 
anything, it could be symbolized it in a more or less adequate way by the 
excesses described by authors such as Bakhtin and Caillois. We do not 
give this exceedance to ourselves, it is something we receive, as we receive 
a gift; and at the same time it is something that we cannot experience in 
loneliness, but it has to be lived and represented only in a communitarian 
dimension. It is already clear that fullness, like meaning, is something 
that is not available to us. This observation is strengthened by a second 
level of considerations, which directly relates to the essence of the feast 
as such. Les fêtes sont fragiles, feasts are fragile, wrote Nancy10: they can 
end up in a bad way or even in disorders. We may add: they do not last 
indefinitely; they entail the return to ordinary time and its troubles. More 
profoundly, this reference of the feast to non-festive aspects, or even to the 
negative aspects of the existence, is included into the very essence of feast, 
inasmuch as the feast is what it is also because it is opposed to them, but 
cannot forget them. Thanks to a sharp phenomenological analysis of this 
phenomenon, Bernhard Waldenfels highlighted that in the feast, like in 
art, are relevant both the experience of order and harmony and the expe-
rience of chaos, both the Apollonian and the Dionysian11.
Therefore in both cases, in that of meaning as well as in that of fullness, 
we grasp the whole in a fragmentary way; and I would say not in a single 
fragment but in the plurality of fragments, in their relations, and thus 
also through the fractures between the fragments. In our finite condition 
we can grasp the whole only through fractures, and that is the reason 
why the whole is not available to us, and appealing to it can always be 
subject to questioning and criticizing. If we grasped always and only the 
fullness, we would be, so to speak, angels; if we never grasped it, we would 
be, if not animals, one-dimensional human beings. Should the difference 
between the everyday life dimension and the sphere of meaning and full-
ness disappear entirely, then it would be the total victory of the tendency 
to reduction, which flattens, especially in the contemporary horizon, all 
forms of experience to their functional dimension, to what is useful. This 
experience of the reduction to utility had already been described by Hegel 
in the Phenomenology of Spirit, as a result of the demystifying process 
enacted by the Enlightenment in its (partly justified) struggle against the 
estranged faith. But if everything is only useful for something else, in a 
[10] J.-L. Nancy, Bref air de fête in “Spazio filosofico” 14 (2015), p. 212.
[11] B. Waldenfels, Feste feiern, wie sie fallen, in “Spazio Filosofico” 14, cit., p. 208 s.
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horizon of total reciprocal functionality, not only sense and fullness, but 
also the human meaning of life disappear.
The experience of the feast is in some way a symbol, to put it in a lan-
guage that takes up that of Assmann, of non-reduction, of the dimension 
of richness and depth that today tends to slip away and hide, but which 
is in any case a constitutive and essential element of human experience.

